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Abstract

Exchange rate

pass~through i~

the phenomenon whereby changes in the

value of foreign exchange are reflected in changes in import prices.

This

paper presents a model in which firms are price setters who anticipate
exchange rate changes.

In equilibrium, firms' strategies incorporate

expectations about the exchange rate consistently and are best responses to
the strategies of all others in the world market.

It is shown that exchange

rate changes give rise to import price changes, but the degree of exchange
rate pass-through depends upon domestic and foreign market structures and the
exchange rate regime.
home

m,~rket

In general, exchange rate pass-through is higher if the

is monopolistic or if the foreign market is competitive.

The

paper ':oncludes with an examination of dis aggregated Japanese manufacturing
price indices, and it shows that the degree of exchange rate pass-through was
indeed correlated with industry concentration during the most recent period of
the yell's depreciation against the dollar.

A Model of Exchange Rate Pass-Through

Eric Q'N. Fisher*

1.

Introduction
During the 1980's, there have been more than 160 days when the

weighted-average value of the dollar varied by more than one percent between
the openlng and closing of the foreign exchange market in New York.

In the

same period, the variance of the monthly changes of the Federal Reserve
Board's dollar index has been more than six percent.

The dollar prices of

non-oil imports, of course, have been much less volatile.

This fact is

difficult to explain if goods are imported at cost in a competitive market.
:~n

oligopolistic industries, however, it has been observed that

domestic currency prices do not move immediately with exchange rate movements.
Even over a relatively long period, these import prices do not reflect
exchange rate movements fully.

The presumption is that producers' profit

margins change, at least in the short run, when foreign exchange values
change.

The empirical studies cited below show that, as a general rule of

thumb, prices of non-oil imports into the United States have reflected only
between fifty and eighty percent of a change in the value of the dollar.
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reflecting those of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or
other members of its staff. The author would like to thank Cathy Mann for
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The relationship between foreign currency price and· domestic currency
price is termed exchange rate pass-through.

There have been quite a few

empirical studies of the phenomenon, and the recent volatility of the dollar
has spurred renewed interest in the subject.

Several studies have s:howed that

the mark-up of import price above marginal cost seems to have increa,sed during
the recent period of the dollar's apppreciation and subsequent rapid decline.
A

recent study of this phenomenon is by Mann [15]; Feinberg [7] and Flood [8]

have also examined exchange rate pass-through.

There are several older

studies as well; see Clark, Logue, and Sweeney [4] and Dunn [6], for example.
While there is a significant literature on the welfare effects of
price variability which dates back to the second war (see Waugh [18], Oi [16],
and Samuelson [17] for a lively debate), it is perhaps surprising thclt there
is relatively little recent theoretical work on the microeconomics of
oligopolistic price setting under exchange rate variability.

Krugmar: [7]

emphasized that the phenomenon of exchange rate pass-through was an area in
which the newer models of international trade theory would find a ready
application; he examined a variety of static and dYnamic models illustrating
aspects of the relationship between currency fluctuations and import price
changes.

Dornbusch [5] also studied the effect of short-term exchange rate

changes in several different models of industrial organization; he emphasized
that market segmentation and market organization influence the relationship
between import prices and exchange rates.

Both of these papers appealed to

the use of several different models of industrial organization to illustrate
disparate facets of exchange rate pass-through.

This paper is meant to

present a unified treatment of pass-through within the framework of one model,
which uses price as the firm's choice variable and
equilibrium concept.

employs a Bayesian Nash

This model captu res four styliz ed facts .

First , it incor porat es the

idea that produ cers set price s in antic ipatio n of excha
nge rate chang es.
Indee d, under the curre nt excha nge raCe regim e, it
would be prohi bitive ly
expen sive for most manu factur ers in indus triali zed
coun tries to chang e their
offer price with every movem ent of the value of foreig
n excha nge.

Secon d, by

emph asizin g the strate gic interd epend ence of produ cers'
decis ions, this model
shows that marke t struc ture has an influe nce on excha
nge rate pass- throu gh.
Third , the model is built upon the premi se that the
effec ts of excha nge rate
chang es are quite diffe rent in. the short run from what
they are in the long
run.

Fourt h, it captu res the notio n that pass- throu gh is
diffe rent under a

regim e of fixed excha nge rates from what it is under
float ing rates .
There are two effec ts that excha nge rate movem ents
have in any marke t.
First , a depre ciatio n makes dome stic produ cers lower
cost-w orld produ cers.
Secon d, a depre ciatio n shift s world deman d towar ds
the home count ry.

It is

not immE !diatel y obvio us what the best respo nse of a
foreig n oligo polis t would
be in such a situa tion.

If he had been pricin g above margi nal cost, shoul d
he

cut his offer price to maint ain world marke t share ?

Will dome stic produ cers

raise price more than propo rtiona tely becau se of incre
ased world deman d for
their goods ?

What are the intera ction s betwe en the best respo nses
of home and

foreig n produ cers?

In perfe ctly comp etitiv e marke ts, will price move exact
ly

to match excha nge rate chang es?

What effec ts will diffe renti al degre es of

dome stic and foreig n comp etitiv eness have on excha nge
rate pass- throu gh?

The

model prese nted here will addre ss these quest ions.
The paper is struc tured as follow s.

In the secon d sectio n, we prese nt

the model , and in the third sectio n, we show that an
equil ibrium exist s for
any descr iption of home and foreig n marke t struc tures
.

In the fourth sectio n,

we describe the effects of exchange rate pass-through in a regime of fixed
exchange rates, and in the fifth section, we show its effects in a regime of
floating rates.

The sixth section presents an empirical analysis of these

ideas using sales and price data from nine Japanese manufacturing industries;
it shows that pass-through was significantly correlated with industry
concentration during the period of the dollars appreciation, but this
correlation is less significant during the dollar's depreciation.

The

seventh section presents our conclusion.

2.

The Model
We assume that there are n domestic firms and n* foreign firms, where

. . .1ntegers.
nand n* are pos1t1ve
as Bertrand competitors.

The firms produce a homogeneous good and act

The firms in anyone country are identical; they

have constant marginal cost and no capacity constraints.

We normalize prices

in the domestic currency so that the marginal cost of a domestic

fi:~m

is

unity. We assume further that foreign marginal costs are unity in tHrms of
foreign currency.
costs are equal.

Hence, when the exchange rate is one, domestic and foreign
This is meant to capture the notion of long-term factor

price equalization, which is of course a real, not a monetary phenomenon.
There is a domestic and a foreign market for the good.

DemCLnd in the

domestic market is given by O(p), and demand in the foreign market i.s given by
D*(p).

These demand functions place the analysis unabashedly within the

framework of partial equilibrium because there are no income

effect~:.

We make

the following further assumptions about demand.

Assumption 1: O(p) and O*(p) are continuous, non-increasing, and concave.
There exists

p>

1 such that, for all p ~

p,

O(p) - O.

Also, 0(0) i.s

finite. Further, there exists 1'* > 1 such that, for all p ~ 1'*, D*(p)
Also, D*(O) is finite.

O.

We do .not assume that 1'=1'*

Assumption 1 states that there are prices above which there is no demand in
the domestic and the foreign market.

It also implies that demand does not

become unbounded as price decreases.

The concavity of the demand in each

country will allow for natural comparative statics; in particular, an expected
depreciation will cause a domestic monopolist to raise his offer.
We can now write the profit function of a domestic producer under the
assumption that his offer is the lowest offer in terms of the domestic
currency.

We have

(s-l)(O(s) + O*(s/e»
1I'(s;e)

where

11'

e is the
cost of

if s/s*

:S

e

(1)

- { 0

if e < s/s*

i:; profits in domestic currency, s is the firm's domestic offer price,
:~ealized

value of the exchange rate, and we recall that the marginal

pl~oduction

depreciat:~on

is normalized to be unity.

of the domestic currency.

Note that an increase in e is a

Domestic currency profits are random

and depend upon the exchange rate because foreign consumers pay a price
denominatE!d in the foreign currency.

Equation (1) uses the implicit

assumption that the home producer cannot discriminate between geographically
distinct markets; this is equivalent to assuming that no dumping is allowed.
We write t:he profit function for an analogous foreign producer for
completenE!ss' sake

if sis *
~(s

*

;e) = { 0
(s*-l)(D(~s*) + D*(s*»

~

e·
(2)

if e

< sis *

where foreign profits are denominated in foreign currency and again we ha'le
used the assumption that foreign marginal costs are unity in terms of

forei~r:

currency.
We assume that the exchange rate e follows a process summarized by
the density fee).

Following the usual convention, we interpret F(t) as the

probability that the event e

~

t occurs, where F(e) is of course the

cumulative distribution function corresponding to fee).

In this case, we

interpret the event F(t) as the event that the level of the exchange rate has
appreciated at least to t.

To avoid mathematical complexities, we shall

assume

Assumption 2: The support of e is either:

(i) a point greater than 0; ()r

(ii~

a subset of the positive real numbers which is a bounded closed interval no:
containing O.

Further, if (ii) is the case, then fee) is continuous,

differentiable on its support, and

~(e)-f(e)/[l-F(e)]

is increasing in e.

The first part of Assumption 2 imposes the constraint that the
cannot depreciate or appreciate infinitely.

exchangE~

rate

The second part of this

assumption ensures that the first order conditions for a firm's expected
profit maximization are well behaved.

The term

~(e)

is the hazard rate

corresponding to the density fee); it is increasing for a normal or a
density.

unifor~

This assumption will enable us to analyze the comparative statics

an expected exchange rate change.

0:

As is typical in analyses of Bertrand competition, we assume that all
demand in any market is allocated to the seller declaring the lowest offer.
The sequence of events influencing the oligopolists' decisions is as follows.
First, ::irms simultaneously announce offers in their respective currencies;
these announcements are interpreted as binding commitments to sell to all
demande;~s,

regardless of provenance, at the announced offer price.

Second,

the exchange rate is realized, and demand is allocated to the lowest offer in
a commOl1 currency.
produce:~(s)
exchang4~

In the case of ties, demand is allocated (equally) to the

having the lowest cost(s), using the realized value of the

rate to compare.

This rationing rule is an artifice used to make

proofs of the existence of an equilibrium easier.

We use it to simplify the

analysis, and it will enable us to use the standard result that the
equilibrium price in a Bertrand game is (just under) the cost of the second
lowest :ost producer.

In a discrete price space, we would not have to worry

about this technicality, and here it does not alter the nature of our results.
The timing of decisions in the model is quite similar to that in
Mankiw [14].

He assumes that firms set prices in anticipation of shocks to

industry demand.
unwilling
so.

~

When there is a small shock to industry demand, firms may be

post to change their prices because they must pay a cost to do

The nature of contracts in international trade and the current volatility

of exchange rates make this assumption about the timing of firms' decisions a
natural one for our model.
We conclude this section with a formal statement of the expected
profits of a home and a foreign producer.

Any producer who does not declare a

minimal offer among the set of producers of his own nationality makes no
profit; hence, we need consider only the most competitive domestic and foreign

offers.

Then, ignoring the possibility of ties for a moment, we call write a

domestic firm's expected profits as

e

V

I :(s;e)

f(e) de

(3)

(sis )

where the upper limit of integration is the highest possible

devalu~tion

that

can occur and the lower limit of integration corresponds to the event whose
probability is F(s/s*) , which occurs when the exchange rate appreciates
sufficiently so that the offer s is no longer competitive against sk, the best
foreign offer.

In particular, l-F(s/s*) is equivalent to the prob~bility that

s < es*, which is the event that the best offer by a domestic firm is the best
offer in the world market.

Likewise, again temporarily ignoring ties, we have

the foreign firm's expected profits given by

f(e) de

(4)

where the lower limit of integration is the greatest possible appre:ciation of
the currency and the upper limit again represents the event that tCte exchange
rate depreciates sufficiently so that the foreign firm's offer is
competitive.

r~

longer

We say that sand s* are equilibrium strategies if, given common

expectations about the exchange rate process as summarized by f(e), s
maximizes (3) and s* correspondingly maximizes (4).

3.

Equilibrium
The central result of this section is that an equilibrium exists for

all pos;;ible combinations of domestic and foreign market structures.

The

assumption of Bertrand competition provides a convenient description of the
domestil: and foreign market structures.

If there is one domestic producer, we

shall say that the domestic market is monopolistic; if there are two or more
domestie producers, we shall say that the domestic market is perfectly
competi·~ive.

We use the analogous definitions for the foreign market.

This

corresponds to the intuition we derive from the fact that two identical
Bertrand competitors price at marginal cost in equilibrium if there is no
capacity constraint facing either one.
We begin with a simple lemma.

Lemma 1: If there are two or more domestic (foreign) producers, then in
equi1ib:~ium

either (i) no domestic (foreign) firm has positive expected sales

or (ii) the best offer by a domestic (foreign) firm is an offer at marginal
cost.

Proof:

Assume that the best offer by a domestic firm is an offer above

marginal cost and that it has positive expected sales.
By assmnption

SO

> 1.

Let

SO

be that offer.

Then, the expected return of that strategy is

e

V(SO) -

J~(s;e) fee) de

(5)

(so/s*)

where again s* is the best foreign offer.

Since the firm has positive

expected sales, sO/s* < e, and for any s satisfying 1 < s < so, it is true
that V(s) > O.

Hence the best response of a firm calling an offer above SO is

to offer some s < so, which contradicts the assumption of equilibrium.
An exactly analogous line of reasoning follows for the case

Q.E.D.

there are two or more foreign competitors.

The intuition behind Lemma 1 is simple enough.

~~ere

If the best offer by a

domestic competitor is above marginal cost and is still good enough t:o have
some chance of beating the best foreign offer, then the best responsE of a
second domestic competitor will be to undercut it.

This allows only for

offers at marginal cost in equilibrium.
We can now state an existence theorem.

Theorem 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an equilibrium exists for all possible
market structures.

Proof:

Whenever n

~

2

and n *

~

2, we can use Lemma 1 to construct an

equilibrium in which all competitors price at their respective marginal costs.
In the rest of the proof, we will explore the cases where n=l or n*=J..
Again, let the infimum of the support of
supremum bye.

By Assumption 2, 0 < e

S e < ~

e be

given by e_ and its

Let S = {s: 1

S

s . .:

- --*
*
max[p,p /e_]}, and S -

- - -*
{s: 1 ~ s ~ max[e p,p ]}.

domestic firm any s f£ S is dominated hy an s
any s E~ S* is dominated by an s

E

S*.

E

Notice that for a

S; likewise, for a foreign finn

Without loss of generality, then, we

can re:;trict our attention to strategies on Sand S*.

Note that Sand S* are

non-empty and compact.
There are two cases to consider: either (i) e is a degenerate random
variable; or (ii) fee) is continuous and differentiable on a closed interval.
If fee) is continuous, for any fixed sand s* played in equilibrium, the
probability that s=es* is zero; hence, we can ignore the possibility of ties.
Considl~r

(3).

the expression for a domestic firm's expected profits as given in

It is easy to see that ~(p) is continuous because D and D* are.

Furthe:r, because fee) is continuous and bounded at the lower limit of
integration, V(s) is continuous on S.

Analogous arguments are true for the

continuity of a foreign producer's expected profits.

Then, by Glicksberg [9],

an equilibrium exists.
If ~ is a degenerate random variable and hence e

e, the theorem

is equivalent to stating that an equilibrium exists in a Bertrand game where
demand is continuous and the competitors have different costs.

Because of the

rationing rule stated in the second section, such an equilibrium exists, with
the

10~lest

cost world producer pricing at the cost of the second lowest cost

firm, using the exchange rate to compare costs of firms of different
nationalities.

Q.E.D.

Before concluding this section, it will be instructive to write out
the

fi:~s t

order condi tion for a monopolis t' s profit maximization.

Differl~ntiating

(3) and taking full advantage of the smoothness of world

demand and the exchange rate distribution, we see that a
equlibrium strategy

dom~stic rnunrJp'J] i~J'

satisfi~s

e

av/as

~ J (a~(s;e)/as)

£(e) de -

(l/s*)~(s;s/s*)

£(s/s*)

O.

(6)

(s/s*)

Recall that s/s* is the level of the exchange rate that just makes the home
firm competitive.

This makes the interpretation of (6) straight-forward; it

says that the equilibrium price charged by the domestic firm is

suc'~

i~~

that

expected marginal profit in states of the world where the exchange rate has
frG~

depreciated sufficiently to make it competitive is just equal to the gain
undercutting the best price of a foreign competitor.

Likewise, the first

order condition for a foreign monopolist is

(sJ/

s

*) *

(a1r

av*/as*

*
(s

*

;e)/a

s) f(e) de - (s/s*2)1r*(s*;s/s*) f(s/s*)

o.

(7 )

e

Again, equation (7) has the interpretation that the foreign firm charges a
price high enough so that the expected marginal increase in profits in sta:es
of the world where the currency appreciates is equal to the loss from not
matching the best price of a home firm at the critical value of the exchange
rate.

These first order conditions will be useful in the subsequent analysis.

4.

Pass-T hroug h Effec ts in a Regime of Fixed Excha nge Rates
In the prece ding sectio n, we conce ntrate d on analy ses
of the

equil ibri\ ~

offer s by dome stic and foreig n firms ; we did not discu
ss the

expec ted E!qui libriu m marke t price that such offer s and
the densi ty of the
excha nge rate entai l. As will become appar ent in this
sectio n, the
equil ibril ~

price preva iling in the marke t does not alway s refle ct
fully

realiz ed c.hang es in the excha nge rate.
We begin with the obser vatio n that the equil ibrium (home
curren cy)
price in the marke t is given by

p(e;s ,s*) - min[s , es*]

(8)

where again sand s* are respe ctive ly the best home and
foreig n firms ' offer s.
An imme diate conse quenc e of the timin g of offer s in the
model is that price s
gx

~

may not refle ct fully the effec ts of large depre ciatio
ns.

To see this

more clear ly, let us turn our atten tion to Figur e 1, which
appea rs on page 33.
Figur e 1 graph s the equil ibrium marke t price in terms
of the realiz ed excha nge
rate under the arbit rary assum ption that (s/s* ) > 1.
Notic e that, for large
depre ciatil Jns the home curre ncy, the equil ibrium price
can be no large r that s
becau se thla best dome stic offer is fixed in the short
term. On the other
hand, rea1:l zation s of the excha nge rate e < (s/s* ) will
resul t in marke t
price s whic:h are lower than s, but even if e < 1, it may
still be the case
that pee) :> 1. As we shall see below , a shift in the
distr ibuti on of the
excha nge rate has two effec ts: first , it cause s firms '
offer s to chang e in a
Bayes ian Nash equil ibrium ; secon d, given those equil ibrium
offer s, it chang es
the expect E!d equil ibrium marke t price . This is an impor
tant posit ive

distinction because equilibrium offers may not be observahle, whereas market
prices are.
We are now in a position to define exchange rate pass-through
formally.

Recall that we have structured the model so that the implicit

status guo is that the current realization of the exchange rate is unity;
moreover, the past expectation of the exchange rate process was also unity,
albeit the distribution of the exchange rate may have had some variance.

The

current market price, however, may not be 1; in particular, it depends upon
the best foreign and domestic offers, which were based upon expectations held
before the current period.

Exchange rate pass-through will be defined with

respect to this benchmark.

Let sand s* be the best offers in an initial

equilibrium where Ee-l, and let s' and s*' be best offers under an
alternative distribution of the exchange rate where Ee~l.

Further, let p(e)

be the pass-through coefficient, where we have denoted explicitly that pass
through depends upon the realization of the exchange rate.

Definition:

p(e) - [p(e;s' ,s*') - p(l;s,s*)]/[e - 1]

We have then

(9)

where p(e) is given in (8) and depends implicitly on sand s* as well as e.
This equation defines observed exchange rate pass-through is the percentage
change in market price divided by the percentage change in the exchange rate.
Notice that p(e) is well defined only when

e~l;

that is, there must be an

exchange rate change in order for there to be exchange rate pass-through.
Although we have defined pass-through in terms of changes in domestic currency
prices, it could have been defined equally well in terms of foreign currency
price changes.

Assume that past expec tation s are summ arized by a degen
erate random
varia ble

e which

is equal tol
to1 with pro?a
pro?abi1ity
bility 1; assum e, not

incon sisten tly, that the curre nt realiz ation of the
excha nge rate is also 1.
Assume furth er that there is a new densi ty for the
excha nge rate such that

Ee

= l+k, for k in a neigh borho od of 0; that is, firms
perfe ctly antic ipate a
deval uatio n (reva luatio n) of lOOk perce nt if k >

° (if k < 0).

We now state a

serie s of lemma ta which lead to the main resul t of
this sectio n.

Lemma 2:

Under fixed excha nge rates , if n > 1 and n* > 1, then
(i) if k < 0,

p(l+k)=l, and (ii) if k > 0, p(l+k)=O.

Proof :

Using Lemma 1, we know that s=s*= l. The concl usion
follow s from the

uniqu eness of the equil ibrium and an evalu ation of
(9).
Q.E.D .

Lemma 2 nhows imme diatel y that excha nge rate chang es
can have asymm etric

effec ts.

This follow s, of cours e from the assum ption that deman
d is alloc ated

accor ding to the lowes t price in domes tic curre ncy.
"re contin ue wi th Lemma 3.

Lemma 3:

Under fixed excha nge rates if n > 1 and n*=l, then
(i) if k < 0,

p(l+k
p(l+k))=O,
=O, and (ii) if k > 0, p(l+k)=O.

Proof : Again , using Lemma 1, we know that s=l.

s*=l/ (l+k) is a best respo nse to s.

It is easy to check that

Again , the concl usion follow s from the

uniqu eness of the equil ibrium and an evalu ation of
(9). Q.E.D .

We now state Lemma 4.

Under fixed exchange rates if n-l and n* > 1, then (i) if k < 0,

Lemma 4:

p(l+k)=l, and (ii) if k > 0, p(l+k)=l.

Proof: The reasoning is exactly analogous to that of Lemma 3.

Q.E D.

We state Lemma 5.

Lemma 5:

Under fixed exchange rates if n=l and n*=l, then (i) if k < 0,

p(l+k)~O,

and (ii) if k > 0, p(l+k)-l.

Proof: If k < 0, then, again using the rationing rule described in section 2,
the unique equilibrium strategies are s*=l/(l+k) and s=l. If k > 0, then the
unique equilibrium is given by s*=l and s-l+k.

Again, the conclusion follows

from an evaluation of (9).

Q.E.D.

We now state the main result of this section

Theorem 2:

Under fixed exchange rates, an appreciation is deflationary if and

only if the foreign market is competitive, and a depreciation is inflationary
if and only if the domestic market is monopolistic.

Proof:

The conclusion follows from Lemmata 2 through 5.

Q.E.D.

Theorem 2 makes explicit our intuition.

We see that there is a strong pass

through e::fect to the extent that the domestic or foreign market structure
enables a producer to use his market power to set price when the exchange rate
moves in 11is favor.
exchange

]~ates,

One policy implication of Theorem 2 is that fixed

with periodic readjustments, display an inflationary bias for

monopolizHd
monopo1izHd industries.

Of course, when we speak of inflation here, we mean a

once and for all change in the price level of an industry, not a persistent
change in the rate of increase of a macro-economic price index.
are not

dE~scribing

a steady state in the international industry.

Moreover, we
Implicit in

our modeli.ng
mode1i.ng framework is the notion that industry costs are equalized at the
prevailin~;

steady-state exchange rate; if there is a depreciation which makes

the domestic industry a world monopoly, then, in the long run, there will be
entry into the industry by a domestic firm or a change of production
techniques by foreign producers to restore the initial status guo in which
both foreign and domestic firms had the same expected costs.

5.

Pass-Through Effects in a Regime of Floating Exchange Rates
In this section, we analyze the effects of pass-through when the

distribution of the exchange rate is not degenerate.
examine the case where the support of
described by Assumption 2(ii).

e is

In particular, we will

an interval and f(e) is smooth, as

This assumption allows in essence for some

short-term price noise, which affects the equilibrium offers of the
oligopolists.
oligopo1ists.

Before proceding to the heart of the analysis, it is worth

mentioning that the assumption of a regime of floating exchange rates gives
rise to an inherent difference between the expected market price and the
realized market price; likewise, there is a difference between the expected

pass- throu gh effec t and the realiz ed pass- throu gh effec
t. 'Unde r a regi.me of
fixed rates , these distin ction s- are moot ,.but it will
be impor tant to have
that distin ction clear ly in mind durin g the rest of
the discu ssion .
It is well known that the conve xity of the profi t funct
ion impli es
that expec ted profi ts incre ase with a mean -prese rving
sprea d of the price of
outpu t. In our model , this impli es that price noise
gives rise to posit ive
expec ted profi ts for a mono polist in of eithe r natio
nality . We state Lemma 6.

Lemma 6:

Under flexi ble excha nge rates , if n-l
n-1 (n*-l ), then eithe r (i) s > 1

(s* > 1) or (ii) the dome stic (forei gn) mono polist has
no expec ted sales .
Furth er, a system of flexib le excha nge rates guara ntees
posit ive expec t3d
profi ts even if there is no expec ted excha nge rate chang
e.

Proof :

Let s* be a best foreig n offer in equil ibrium .

home firm has no expec ted sales .

If -es * s 1, then a

If 1 < es*, then for any s such that I <

5

< -es * , we have

e

V(s)

J :(s;e )

f(e) de > 0

(10)

(s/s )

where in (12) V, again , is the value of the game for
the home firm.
exact ly analo gous argum ent is true for a foreig n mono
polist .
the lemma follow s from the fact that if
1 < e.

Ee -

An

The last part of

1,
I, Assum ption 2(ii) impli es e

Q.E.D.

<

The intui ~::ion behind Lemma 6 is that the assumption of flexible exchange rates
introduce:;

enoug~

l~ate

exchange

price noise so that, if there is some chance that the

will depreciate, a domestic monopolist can still have positive

expected :;ales by pricing above marginal cost.
The best response of a monopolist will in general dependt upon all the
moments of the distribution of the exchange rate.

The easiest way to see this

is to rewrite equation (6) as

e

Ja,,(,,;

e) las f(e) de -

[(s-1) IS*) [D(s) + D* (s*) J f(s/s*).

(11)

(s/s*)

Equation (11) is a restatement of the first order necessary condition for a
home monopolist.

The left hand side of (11) depends not only on the mean of

the exchange rate but also on the weight that the density f(e) places on
different levels of marginal profits in the world market.
TIlis leads us to examine a class of shifts of the distribution of the
exchange rate which change the first moment but not any other central moments.
In partic\llar, we will examine distributions which belong to the same location
family.

Let f(e) be an arbitrary distribution satisfying Assumption 2(ii) and

fef(e)de •• 1.

For k in a neighborhood of 0, we define

Definitiotl: The density g is a k-shift of f if and only if g(e+k) - f(e).

This defitlition is convenient because the expectation of the exchange rate
with reSpE!ct to f is 1, while its expectation with respect to g is l+k.

The definition of a k-shift captures the idea thab the

exchan~;e

rate

is expected to depreciate by k with no change in its variance or othel'
moments.

Because the status guo level of the exchange rate is assumed. to be

unity, implicit in the assumption that the expectation of the exchange rate is
1 is the idea that the exchange rate follows a random walk.

We are

interested, however, in more general exchange rate processes.
We proceed with an analysis of the effect of an expected change in the
level of the exchange rate.

The assumption that the exchange rate

distribution is given exogenously is equivalent to the assumption that the
oligopolists are Bayesians who share a common prior on how the exchange rate
will move.

If their expectation of the exchange rate is given by Jef(e)de-l,

then they assume implicitly that the exchange rate follows a random walk,
whereas if there expectation is given by Jeg(e)de-l+k, then they expect the
exchange rate to move by lOOk percent.

We now state a simple result h,iving to

do with the comparative statics of equilibrium.

Lemma 7:

Under a regime of floating exchange rates, an expected depreeiation

(appreciation) causes a domestic monopolist to raise (lower) his offer,
Further, a domestic monopolist's equilibrium offer is unique.

Proof:

We examine a k-shift of the exchange rate.

equation (11), which is equivalent to

Recall that s

solvE~s

e

[l/f(s/s*)J

Ja~(s;e)/as f(e)

de -

~(s;s/s*).

(12)

(s/s*)

The right side of (12) is increasing for any s less than the monopoly price in
Because O*(p)
D*(p) is concave, we know that, for all e ~ s/s*,

the world market.

a~(s;e)/as ~ a~(s;s/s*)/as.

Hence,

e

[l/f(s/s*)J

Ja~(s;e)/as f(e)

de

~ a~(s;s/s*)/as [l-F(s/s*)J/[f(s/s*)],

de

~ a~(s;s/s*)/as [l/~(s/s*)l

(s/s*)

which is equivalent to

e

[l/f(s/s*)]

Ia~(s;e)/as f(e)

(13)

(s/s*)

where again

~(.)

is the hazard rate of the density f(·).

By Assumption 2, we

know that [l/~(s)] is decreasing in s; since O(p)
D(p) and O*(p)
D*(p) are concave,
a~(s;s/,;*)/as is also decreasing in s.

decreaslng in s.

Hence, the the left side of (12) is

This establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium offer.

Further, note that for all k > 0

e

e

Ja~(s;e)/as

f(e) de

~ J.a~(S;e+k)/as

f(e) de.

(s/s*)

(s/s*)

Hence, a k-shift of the exchange is equivalent to an outward shift of the
curve defined implicitly by the left side of (12).

This implies that an

expected depreciation causes a domestic monopolist' equilibrium offer to rise.
The reasoning for an appreciation is exactly analogous. Q.E.D,

For completeness, we state Lemma 8.

Lemma 8:

Under a regime of floating exchange rates, an expected depreciation

(appreciation) of the home currency causes a foreign monopolist to lower
(raise) his offer.

Further a foreign monopolist's equilibrium offer is

unique.

Proof:

This follows as a corollary of Lemma 7.

Q.E.D.

We are now in a position to examine systematically the effect:s of
exchange rate pass-through with respect to market structure.

Assume for the

next four lemmata that the past expectations of the exchange rate were such
that Ee = 1, the current value of the exchange rate is also 1, and there has
been a shift of expectations so that now Ee = l+k for some k in a nei.gborhood
of O.

Lemma 9:

Under floating exchange rates, if n > 1 and n* > 1, then tr.e pass-

through function is given by

if e < 1
p(e) - {

:

if e > 1

Proof :

The proof is ident ical to that of Lemma 2.

Q.E.D .

Note that the expec ted pass- throu gh for this indus try
is given by l-F(l+ k),
which state s that highe r expec ted pass- throu gh is assoc
iated with large r
expec ted appre ciatio ns.

Likew ise, the highe r the proba bility of a

depre ciatio n, the less likel y that any pass- throu gh
will be obser ved.

We contin ue with Lemma 10.

Lemma lQ:

Under floati ng excha nge rates if n > 1 and n*-l, then
the pass-

throu gh funct ion is given by

(es*' -l)/(e -l)
p(e) -

{

a

if e ::s l/s*'
if e > l/s*'

where s*, is the foreig n mono polist 's equil ibrium offer
under the assum ption
that Ee-l+ k.

Proof : Under the initi al excha nge rate expec tation s,
we know that s-l and

s* > 1.

Hence , p(l;s ,s*)- l.

using Lemmata 1 and 6,
If the new expec tation s of

the excha nge rate are such that Ee-l+ k, it is still
true that s'=l, but
s*'~s*.

None theles s, using Lemma 6, s*, > 1.

The concl usion then follow s

from the uniqueness of the equilibrium and an evaluation of (9).

Q.E.D.

There are three important observations to make about Lemma 10.

Firs'~, by the

assumption that the current level of the exchange rate is 1 and the fact that
the foreign monopolist took advantage of

~

ante flexible rates to shade up

his offer above marginal cost, only the home firms had sales in the initial
equilibrium. Hence, the initial market price was 1.

Second, there are small

realized appreciations (l/s*' < e < 1) for which there is no pass-through;
this occurs because foreign monopolists have higher (expected) profi1: margins
than the domestic competitors.

Third, even if there is a

larg~

enough

realized appreciation so that we observe pass-through, we have p(e) <: 1
s*, > 1.
because s*'

Hence, we will never see full exchange rate pass-through.

We now state Lemma 11.

Lemma 11:

Under floating exchange rates if n-l and n* > 1, then the pass-

through function is given by

I
p(e) -

{

(s'-l)/(e-l)

if e < s'
if e

~

s'

Proof: In the initial equilibrium, the best response of the foreign firms was
s*-l, while that of the domestic monopolist was s > 1.

Under the new exchange

rate expectations, we still have s*-l and s' > 1.

The conclusion follows from

an evaluation of (9).

Q.E.D.

Because the foreign firms make offers at cost and the domestic monopolist
makes an offer above cost, there are small depreciations for which the foreign
competite,rs still supply the world market.

This corresponds to the common

notion that foreign firms are keeping their offers down so as to maintain
market share;

what is really happening is the domestic producer prices above

cost even if there is an expected appreciation.
Finally, we state Lemma 12.

Under fixed exchange rates if n-l and n*~l, then the pass-through

Lemma 12

function is given by

[es*' - min[s,s*]]/[e-l]
p(H) -

{

[s' - min[s,s*]]/[e-l]

Proof:

if e < s/s*'
if e ~ s/s*'

In the initial equilibrium, the best offers were given by sand s * .

By Lemma t"

we know that s

> 1 and s* > 1.

price p(l;s,s*) - min[s,s*].

Therefore, the initial equilibrium

The conclusion follows form an evaluation of

equation (9).

Q.E.D.

We have illustrated way each monopolist's offer changes under the asssumption
of an anticipated depreciation in Figure 2, which appears on page 34.

Figure

2 illustrates the two ways that an expected depreciation affects the
equilibriwn market price.

First, the best offer of the domestic firm rises

and that of the foreign firm falls.

Second, the entire exchange rate

distribution shifts rightward, increasing the likelihood that a depreciation
will actua:.ly be realized.

There are two point s worth emph asizin g about Lemma
12.

First , the

marke t price is above cost even when the realiz ation
of the excha nge rate is

1; we know, of cours e, that this follow s from the fact that
price noise allow s
both inter natio nal duop olists to make offer s above
cost.

Since we hav'e not

made any assum ptions about the syrnmmetry of the excha
nge rate distri butio n or
about that of world deman d, we canno t determ ine 2 prior
i wheth er s > s* or s <
s*. We do know, howev er, for e-l, that min[s ,es*] >
1; this impli es that
p(l;s ,s*) > 1.

Secon d, when there is an expec ted large depre ciatio n

(appr eciati on), there are small realiz ed depre ciatio
ns (appr eciati ons) such
that the equil ibrium home curre ncy marke t price actua
lly falls (rise s); that
is, obser ved pass- throu gh can actua lly be negat ive.

Lemm ata 7 and 8 imply

that the home mono polist raise s (lowe rs) his offer
in expec tation of the
depre ciatio n (appr eciati on), while the foreig n mono
polist lower s

(raisl ~s)

his

offer .

We have graph ed the pass- throu gh funct ion, under the
assum ptiol1 of an
expec ted depre ciatio n and using some arbit rary best
respo nse param eter:;, in
Figur e 3, which appea rs on page 35.
We now state the main resul t of this sectio n

Theor em 3:

If there is an expec ted depre ciatio n (appr eciati on),
then

pass- throu gh will be highe r (lowe r) if the dome stic
(fore ign) marke t

E~xpec ted

i~:

mono polist ic relat ive to its foreig n (dome stic) count
erpar t.

Proof :

This follow s direc tly from Lemmata 9 throug h 12.

Q.E.D .

This theore m is of cours e the analo g, for a regim e
of float ing excha nge rates ,
of Theor em 2.

In parti cular , it makes the posit ive predi ction that,
under the

current market expectations of a depreciation of the dollar, observed exchange
rate pass-through will be higher in domestic industries which are monopolistic
than in those which are competitive.

Further, during the period of the

dollar's expected appreciation, one should have observed lower pass-through in
industries which were foreign monopolies.

This occurs, of course, because

monopolists of either nationality will increase their profit margins when the
exchange rate is expected to move in their favor.

6.

Observed Pass-Through in Japanese Manufactures
In this section, we present evidence on the relationship between

industry concentration and exchange rate pass-through during 1984 and 1986.
These are of course both periods during which the major currencies were
floating, and the first was a period of strong yen depreciation (against the
dollar), while the second was one of strong yen appreciation.

We assume that

oligopolists expected the yen to weaken against the dollar in 1984 and to
strengtb~n

in 1986.

We did not use data from 1985 because it was a year of

changing; expectations about the yen's strength.

Our theoretical analysis

makes the positive prediction that pass-through will be higher in Japanese
industries which were relatively concentrated.
It is unfortunately extremely difficult to get a current measure of
concentration in a cross-spectrum of Japanese industries.

There is some work

on industrial organization in Japan by Caves and Uekusa [3], but they rely on
concentI'ation ratios collected by the Fair Trade Commission of Japan given in

[10].

lbose ratios are dated, and they give only the historical evolution of

concentI'ation within selected industries, not concentration across a sample of
industri.es.

In order to construct measures of concentration across

industries, we used the Japan Statistical Yearbook [11].

The chapt1ar entitled

Business Operations gives sUmmary aggregate financial data for prinicpal
enterprises in a cross-spectrum of industries; a principal enterprise is
either a company with a capitalization of at least one billion yenor a
company which is considered a "leading enterprise" in its industry.

In 1981,

there were a total of 342 such companies in the nine manufacturing industries
in our sample.

These data are not given on a firm by firm basis but are

presented as a total for all the principal entreprises in an industry.
chapter also gives total sales figures for these different
industries.

This

manufact'~ring

These sales figures were used to calculate a rough measure of

industry concentration in 1981, and they are reported in the first ,:olumn of
the table below.
It is of course almost impossible to get data on oligopolists' offers,
but the Research and Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan does provide
disaggregated wholesale price indices in [2].

These indices are disaggregated

into ten different manufacturing subsectors, and they are further
disaggregated in each subsector into average prices for exports, imports, and
goods produced for domestic demand.

The manufacturing subsectors correspond

serendipitously to those defined in the Japan Statistical Yearbook, and nine
of the universe of ten were chosen for the table below.

The petroleum

industry was excluded because there is only one petroleum product exported
from Japan, and its pricing did not move at all with exchange rate
adjustments.

Exchange Rate Pass-Through and Industrial Concentration in Japanese
Manufacturing Industries in 1984 and 1986
Concentration
Manufacturing Industry
Processed Foodstuffs
Machinery
Ceramic, Stone, and Clay Products
Textile Products
Chemicals and Allied Products
Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and
Supplies
Non-Ferrous Metal Products
Iron and Steel
Transport Equipment

1984

1986

(A)

(B)

(C)

22.7
23.2

1.6
1.1
4.9
-1.4
1.6

-9.6
-4.5
-14.7
-5.7
-14.9

0.1

-3.7

9.1
5.2
4.5

6.7
-14.6
-1.1

24.8
36.0
37.3
43.6
46.1
59.6
76.6

Notes:
All numbers are percents. Column (A) measures the ratio of sales by principal
enterprises to total industry sales in 1981. Column (B) measures the
difference between the change in export prices and domestic prices for each
industry during the twelve months ending in December 1984. Column (C) is the
analagous measure for the twelve months ending in November 1986. The sources
are described in the text.

The industries are presented in order of increasing concentration.
The second column gives the percentage difference between the change in
industrie:~'

average export prices and and average domestic prices during 1984,

and the third column gives the analogous number for 1986.
differencl~

We use the

between export prices and domestic prices in order to control for

the effec1: that exchange rate movements had on costs, which was explicitly not
a part of our model.

First, it is reassuring that export prices rose more

rapidly than domestic prices when the yen was depreciating and fell more
rapidly when the yen was appreciating; this is of course one of the positive
implications of our theory.

Second, the Spearman statistic for the rank

correlation between pass-through and industry concentration is significant at
the ninety percent confidence level for 1984, but its is not significant for

1986.

The small decrease in the export prices of transport equipment

contributes to the rejection of a

rank~orrelation

in 1986.

Perhaps the

"voluntary" export restraints on automobile exports to the United States have
sufficiently cartelized the international industry so that Japanese firms have
not had to cut export prices significantly as the yen has appreciated.

7.

Conclusion
The central conclusion of this paper is that observed

pass-through depends upon market structure.

exchang4~

rate

This conclusion was corroborated

by evidence from a sample of Japanese manufacturing industries during the
period of the yen's depreciation.

In particular, the model shows tha1:

oligopolists use their market power to set prices in anticpation of exchange
rate movements;

we should expect, then, to see higher rates of infla1:ion in

relatively concentrated domestic industries during the course of the eurrent
depreciation of the dollar.
Two limitations of this model are that it is a model of a homogeneous
good produced by identical firms facing no capacity constraints and that it
does not consider the longer run evolution of market structure.

First:, much

of the growth of international trade in the last decades has occurred in goods
where product differentiation is important, and the current internatic1nal
environment for commercial policy makes the assumption of no capacity
constraints quite suspect.

It is unfortunate that product differentiation and

barriers to trade are a very real part of any oligopolistic international
industry; indeed, they probably serve to create such oligopolies.

Second, the

model did not investigate the effects of continued exchange rate shock.s on the
evolution of the number of firms in an industry.

We did not model the entry

or exil: decisions of firms in industries where there were positive or zero
expectE!d profits.

See Baldwin [1] for some recent work on the effect of sunk

costs i.n an environment with exchange rate variability.
The model does serve to underscore several important considerations.
First, the strategic inter-dependence of firms' decisions are an important
part of the pass-through effect.

Second, one ought not to expect that

exchange rate pass-through is uniform across industries that have different
competitive structures; moreover, home monopoly tends to increase pass-through
while foreign monopoly tends to decrease it.

Third, both exchange rate

expectations and realizations matter for equilibrium prices in oligopolies.
In particular, the large depreciation of the dollar during the last eighteen
months Inay matter less than oligopolists' expectations about how the dollar
will mO'7e during the course of their firms' current planning horizons.
Fourth, although exchange rate volatility increases the profit margins of
monopoli.stic firms, it does so at the expense of consumer surplus.

It is in

this sense that volatile exchange rates, like barriers to trade, may serve to
decrease world welfare while raising the expected profits of producers in
oligopolistic industries.
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Equilibrium Market Price as a Function of the Realized
Exchange Rate
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